Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1609e774905fab8e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.7 KB Created: 2020-11-05 02:09:35 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-12
MD5: 2bfa2b54ad2171de126b0ccbc23ee532 SHA-1: 1445ab27f4196f7f24cb438fcb18261726b16f32 SHA-256: 1609e774905fab8e2582dc509266c3564302fc8df1dd4748c9854904084f3562
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many pointing to disposable domains and Weebly-hosted PDFs, indicating a link farm. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure, suggesting the ultimate goal is to lead users to malicious content or malware. The ML classifier also strongly flagged this PDF as malicious.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/aws?keyword=program+to+convert+infix+to+prefix+in+c In PDF document text
    • https://getedizexagan.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740146/mujosudawutomu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vorarixumo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134490966/diwetubikelixefun.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://davavenetu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134500413/5920606.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fulipevaxavu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695351/9997097.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4383795/normal_5f99f18c63af1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gonoloxezejuje.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131410007/9858893.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://genigudepa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070712/velowo_dakemolaku.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wepugimi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070973/tedunobedodogugurow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://galavalo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134464717/3418032.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4367000/normal_5fa3277cb5b7f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://waratonis.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134235653/7759920.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4370057/normal_5fa02822dd4eb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://naxedomabaxa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606472/a7c41d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://moguvikob.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874292/fobex.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1a51f5b8-ed9f-4853-8e1d-8ac66941741d/wirifowo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005f3a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5F3A 5252 bytes
SHA-256: 00ad7e790e6db45a9d365a0d885053b79c8faecabb6f0ff956b9aacd934dd84a
font_01_sfnt_off0000711b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x711B 12040 bytes
SHA-256: 3397d711127ef50ba9c3faebd96735ed90afff178b9f10daa1fe188619d04c25

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