Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 15ecabde8f13d2bd…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

576.4 KB Created: 2021-04-18 19:39:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2026-03-25
MD5: 363709a86c838946aa981a0f225f9874 SHA-1: 92d619d2b0074150e1578ccac485894c7cb0c6e5 SHA-256: 15ecabde8f13d2bdc65c990f09f4790bd881b92193916aed7f6ea1a3281e6564
382 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious OOXML document that leverages an embedded RTF object to exploit multiple known vulnerabilities, including CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2017-8759, within Microsoft Equation Editor and MSXML. These exploits facilitate the execution of arbitrary code, indicating the document's primary purpose is to act as a dropper for further malicious activity. The presence of RTF injection and OLE object data strongly suggests a client-side exploit chain.

Heuristics 10

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    (in altChunk RTF word/rastr.rtf) RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    (in altChunk RTF word/rastr.rtf) RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • CVE-2026-21514 — Word/OLE security bypass in RTF high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    (in altChunk RTF word/rastr.rtf) RTF contains a hidden \svb hex package with DrsE2oDoc and downRevStg drawing compatibility parts. This matches an observed CVE-2026-21514 exploitation shape that manipulates Word's internal document structure and trust decisions.
  • altChunk imports embedded RTF (RTF injection) critical OOXML_ALTCHUNK_RTF
    Document inlines an embedded RTF via an aFChunk relationship and a <w:altChunk> body element. This is the canonical RTF-injection wrapper used to smuggle RTF exploits (Equation Editor / URL Moniker / objdata) past DOCX-only scanners. Word opens the wrapper and executes the RTF inline. Recursing into the RTF for the exact exploit primitive.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    (in altChunk RTF word/rastr.rtf) RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    (in altChunk RTF word/rastr.rtf) RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    (in altChunk RTF word/rastr.rtf) RTF contains ~1001KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    (in altChunk RTF word/rastr.rtf) RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    (in altChunk RTF word/rastr.rtf) RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/properties
    • http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/infopath/2007/PartnerControls
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/customXml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/contentType
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/properties/metaAttributes
    • http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/documentManagement/types
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/metadata/core-properties
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://purl.org/dc/terms/
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/internal/obd
    • http://dublincore.org/schemas/xmls/qdc/2003/04/02/dc.xsd
    • http://dublincore.org/schemas/xmls/qdc/2003/04/02/dcterms.xsd
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/sharepoint/v3/contenttype/forms
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/cus�

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000af79f.bin
e4ececa3bf3aac327f59685222dd29ad0d1f7260fc868ed95d6d36904b0b4e04
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAF79F 91463 bytes
objdata_01_off000e71aa.bin
886b62884d874ef7cbf8fdf3517674d4b6a37e0fc7ff8f44f0c0cd9c5a19b566
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xE71AA 583146 bytes
objdata_02_off00382935.bin
47339b925079f7f97966cf6e9e64b7423e6159d33d24aa960f9068e8596e9bd4
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x382935 32814 bytes
rtf_svb_00000009.zip
28fc295dafc0bcccd998d6dc34a4e9ae47eb34cb74cb4b892eb6454833467799
rtf-svb-package RTF \svb hex-decoded ZIP at offset 0x9 116932 bytes