Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 15e9c90dd05a8d13…

MALICIOUS

PDF

58.3 KB Created: 2020-10-28 07:21:37 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-14
MD5: 13d8170a8e691e1e5d27fdfac56751c3 SHA-1: 38fc57fa15d1f9addfe910c8842fb3dba88cf996 SHA-256: 15e9c90dd05a8d13b7b910bf2fd35235a12cc080232e8d7673e61122dee5f1a9
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF document was flagged by a machine learning classifier and contains numerous embedded links. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure, while others indicate a link farm designed for SEO manipulation. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains a URL that appears to be the primary redirect target.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.me/123?keyword=the+crow+city+of+angels+soundtrack+blogspot In PDF document text
    • https://pigogokeda.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857695/devewatavonixo_marige.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bafovulik.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070506/siwekofiwiviz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mijisurux.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070147/lotoxogu-gumobilisim-nexel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zesopupejilit.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738861/pezakumapeloni_ripokus.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xonimitofowe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682232/5840ac8ed9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tivakoxidedopa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776298/7854898.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wegogutez.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134310606/zilolu_pasuvu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kokexofagisukop.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132710589/vufatoxozowinev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bavejojonosepes.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380601/jugufuzeb-budaw-wezolozez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vodexekuteb.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776001/4223142.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zoxuzuxebexot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969059/metor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jopalezaleloloj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380469/nefiwupolugu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4370266/normal_5f9434d7c5582.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4376879/normal_5f926b7e78e38.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369524/normal_5f901203d7ca7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366008/normal_5f873cacbebc6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366305/normal_5f8a4c2c86238.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368970/normal_5f8f25b45ef9d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4377674/normal_5f94aa8b6bcf6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365570/normal_5f8750088aa4d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366947/normal_5f87526e3f1bc.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4389585/normal_5f98f7d9de6ab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/rexogeguxosix/27884883643.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/henghuili-files/55149759620.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/matogapibelifiv/8673056830.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/suxiweke/80104885699.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000914b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x914B 5644 bytes
SHA-256: e10afd6ddfb9706ddc46a16d6606fb0eceab60b254eb88710848eca0fd7b1144
font_01_sfnt_off0000a487.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA487 12772 bytes
SHA-256: 1a6404e85575160b9246229b113a5b4f3a4ee52ce97b0d7472e43463c01f5863
font_02_sfnt_off0000cd42.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCD42 4324 bytes
SHA-256: ff5f0ef16caf3e97cd1984b3a03ea88e11eab8cf63d2ee006085a4b9995833f3