Office (OOXML) / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 15de5dae7a4b941d

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

27.8 KB Created: 2021-07-22 15:39:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000

MD5: 23a471d956410bc80dc0cabc006252f6 SHA-1: dab043429ae0245be571450672b4c34270cb9518 SHA-256: 15de5dae7a4b941d941f25cdb281c706714758f80878e47c315c5f3d1c8733e8

272 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a VBA macro with an auto-executing Document_Open subroutine. This macro uses obfuscated calls to CreateObject and Shell to download and execute a second-stage payload. The script attempts to write to the Run key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\IAccessible2Proxy and constructs a URL to download a payload from http://evil.tld/payload.exe.

Heuristics 9

Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL

Shell() call in VBA
Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER

Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN

Document_Open macro
CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ

CreateObject call
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC

Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA

Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON

Environ() call (env variable access)
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `886f329a51cadcf4a8addc47317b281fdd0bcabf383c59e157fc0f4660bc6358`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML)	8336 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
`vbaProject_00.bin` `4729a664f2ed4ec055806e75c199582d004a7f0e0e70a56902496a62a127ddf2`	vba-project	OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin	31232 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

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