Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Heuristics 9

• Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
  A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
• VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
  Document contains VBA macro code
• VBA copies the workbook into the Excel XLSTART startup folder high OLE_VBA_XLSTART_PERSISTENCE
  The macro saves a copy of the workbook into Application.StartupPath (the Excel XLSTART folder) so the code auto-loads every time Excel starts. This is the persistence stage of a resident Excel macro virus, not normal document behaviour.
  Matched line in script

    If ThisWorkbook.Path <> Application.StartupPath And Dir(Application.StartupPath & "\" & "1006ㄗ攣ㄘ.xls") = "" Then

• VBA infects other workbooks via an OnSheetActivate copy hook high OLE_VBA_WORKBOOK_INFECTION_SPREADER
  The macro installs an Application.OnSheetActivate handler that copies a sheet (carrying the macro) into the active workbook whenever a sheet is activated. This is the replication stage of a resident Excel macro virus: it infects every workbook the user opens.
  Matched line in script

    Application.OnSheetActivate = "1006ㄗ攣ㄘ.xls!acop"

• VBA hooks the VBE-editor / macro-list keys to evade inspection high OLE_VBA_VBE_KEY_HOOK_EVASION
  The macro reroutes Alt+F11 (Visual Basic editor) and/or Alt+F8 (macro list) through Application.OnKey, so an analyst's attempt to open the macro code is intercepted. This anti-analysis trick is a hallmark of resident Excel macro viruses hiding the viral module while it is loaded.
  Matched line in script

    Application.OnKey "%{F11}", "1006ㄗ攣ㄘ.xls!escape"

• Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
  Auto_Open macro
  Matched line in script

  Sub auto_open()

• PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
  PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
• Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
  The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns# In document text (OLE body)

  • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In document text (OLE body)
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
  • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In document text (OLE body)
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In document text (OLE body)
  • http://www.iec.chIn document text (OLE body)

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