Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 156a515950a0e206…

MALICIOUS

PDF

82.0 KB Created: 2021-08-20 12:32:34 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 10f5eda933e0775ee0be1daf0159022a SHA-1: 6eed3831888005f16e84d1349ce64b2b77617b61 SHA-256: 156a515950a0e206b8e40c2d223caac2453018e0056c208da53a6c2d8627b0bb
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains numerous links pointing to compromised CMS uploads and disposable hosting, indicating a phishing or malware distribution attempt. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely to trick users into downloading further payloads from the provided URLs. No scripts were extracted, but the PDF structure itself is used to host malicious links.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9987

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.hauptsache.cc/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160abcfdc56e42---nuwosag.pdf
    • http://klingende-zeder.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606d5b0725c14---95924611288.pdf
    • http://ledesmasportsmedicinesavannahcentury.com/clients/4/44/449a5b3489ef279447e90cf6cdd72f1c/File/67028990346.pdf
    • http://h-p-n.fr/catalogue_dynamique/file/9228193614.pdf
    • https://alstar.uz/images/shared/file/woruso.pdf
    • https://susta.vn/userfiles/file/vinapokigamesimeni.pdf
    • https://michelbarbot.com/upload/files/lunufelijenejelojexa.pdf
    • http://julieesteban.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609e92686f1ae---dojazanunuxufuz.pdf
    • https://www.hausbootgeiseltalsee.de/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/si92d02o264h6itag6se7qd818/49420077612.pdf
    • https://betonwerkendejonge.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609d66e126b1d---politofowikasawibidow.pdf
    • https://civilkontroll.hu/uploads/file/41718030877.pdf
    • https://rdsdealers.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/dujavitozadaduve.pdf
    • http://mognational.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160804ac72c5ba---pivazizet.pdf
    • http://www.siscbolivia.com/admin/uploaded/fck/file/zimedenifoguzuvoxap.pdf
    • http://dzbnf.com/upload/file///nilipofiditasisemuso.pdf
    • https://www.masismarketing.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/18d4b3078aea6e3ed2ab5886b7832a09/31349250330.pdf
    • http://bochosushi.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607f62b96c495---78567049875.pdf
    • https://www.skyline-recruiting.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/1c068574521f01d9fb8bb7ceebd8a9dc/22991766528.pdf
    • http://www.shipsupply.co.mz/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160798d7110b79---gijorasikow.pdf
    • https://cristiandellavedova.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/s3l1knub2hv1ului0hg6k896h3/25635092645.pdf
    • http://www.patricktennis.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c36a2291c8b---xexubologapabet.pdf
    • http://slstudio.it/userfiles/files/gonototenu.pdf
    • http://www.theagentpipeline.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bf2d4400cdf---65449636595.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/YTWXjIUwRh0/uplcv?utm_term=what+should+i+caption+my+brother+picture
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dc63.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDC63 16792 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000f47a.bin
762b85fb0a3765c74b1c4419a71f4598c5068d0c363a6ce51cff6825e839afb8
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF47A 11128 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00010e12.bin
d5c3078b519c5f87ba1ef84629fcaaf82d666b447c9fe05378e5f62b6d0b3799
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10E12 16820 bytes