Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1566ee8013418429…

MALICIOUS

PDF

81.2 KB Created: 2020-11-19 06:53:24 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-26
MD5: 76e67cbbb7dd65ca974d4650e4f618a4 SHA-1: d9c74136917c8e73ac79ebdb663b8e703ad60011 SHA-256: 1566ee8013418429cae08c93ef0ea9a93822bde73e89361e632f4699d7a7bdbb
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a significant number of embedded links, many pointing to disposable hosting and redirector infrastructure, as indicated by the 'PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM' and 'PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK' heuristics. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or SEO spam campaigns. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was heavily obfuscated.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9995

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/strik?utm_term=winx+dvd+ripper+audio+out+of+sync In PDF document text
    • https://finijuzado.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134444754/2176042.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4374196/normal_5fa20f6077789.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4412377/normal_5f9c6c3cd40f3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nifufoji.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134458522/4877407.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://natizupasa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437725/saloviganepepi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gonerogad.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438616/bidevuxala.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xobesatiwum.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134359431/geludawuw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gimejexoxixaza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131872185/kirorafagosox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/545aef9d-3c44-4e31-a646-f96d4c4f0e89/xorurerepes.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1b61359d-a09c-40c7-a3d4-c598180b46c5/95047794945.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zeworibuzoza/14705738164.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zepifudoxapo/datus.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e5a4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE5A4 2900 bytes
SHA-256: 40ce0bc9b113ef031639604f059b60aa9f1e41b097d60e75bfbf620cccc66306
font_01_sfnt_off0000efe8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEFE8 5240 bytes
SHA-256: f4738f3251ac3bb1392e7805c3d874053086e4e770f8c2da4a35ef5f42f20b2a
font_02_sfnt_off000101da.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x101DA 11524 bytes
SHA-256: 027e98a04126c262ed347b5538877af4b5c7606b4bbda141c2c90a5e1310e9ea
font_03_sfnt_off00012941.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12941 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 05d2457133b820fa77aa358e30e9acfbad3f04c46ced9a37296d9311117db176

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