Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1549aaec6d270f12…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

34.1 KB First seen: 2023-06-10
MD5: 6c98c9f172134e72fcca72840dd66877 SHA-1: 60ae5b5b56f9c67842a7e1f99ab932f3ad97860b SHA-256: 1549aaec6d270f12c848e1839c6cfad2eb5f7a930cdc864c3069df29fc18f0be
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with an Equation Editor ProgID and an objupdate directive, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing' to view the content, which is a common technique for malware droppers. The presence of these elements strongly suggests an exploit delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000539b.bin
a7d9f95ca182b28c51bb590630746063e1588f7d1edd5cdae0058fd80805a5ec
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x539B 1696 bytes