Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 153d9bd77c2f43f9…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

47.9 KB First seen: 2023-09-11
MD5: 9fd3a5b1277977f44b798739075c4959 SHA-1: 7441e3cb1ca6a191ae55182dc5f74d2596f3b75c SHA-256: 153d9bd77c2f43f9092654c7f61b914f204889a6a78a628f44a5cbd65af3e4a2
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The sample is an RTF document that leverages OLE object data and specifically targets the Equation Editor vulnerability. The document body contains a lure to 'Enable editing' to bypass security measures. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJAUTLINK, RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR, and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics strongly indicates the exploitation of OLE objects, likely to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00003b83.bin
cdfb52b36218c66fe68c2a059c1894b22d44d4b3b0fca344f788faa3a41ad71b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3B83 1419 bytes