Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 15329a706801a5cd…

MALICIOUS

PDF

53.2 KB Created: 2020-08-20 08:14:06 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: ded0f581c2f0b13696ee1efadfdc6985 SHA-1: 5c12c866f23042315f985a7623723eb9e09c40a6 SHA-256: 15329a706801a5cd07c24cf0d68f4f42d4fc87352ae36ad227906aede1e79692
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs, with a critical heuristic firing for a malicious redirector link. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains references to URLs that are part of a link farm, suggesting an attempt to drive traffic to malicious sites. The presence of a password archive lure heuristic indicates a potential multi-stage attack where the user is prompted to download an archive, likely containing a payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=github+android+chat+app
    • http://rumet.centreformindfulness.ca/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874493/7796322.pdf
    • http://rusigepok.kamaroufi.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682156/63b6a2d1a0.pdf
    • http://files.bcschem.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775232/zabepokipofopurog.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/0379/7913/files/haldol_gotas_bula.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/2694/0067/files/wordpress_change_domain.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/7221/6483/files/card_player_magazine.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/6761/3087/files/wurefanamufawedefivad.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/9394/0641/files/building_electrical_system_design.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/6194/3199/files/bv_company_formation.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/4143/8366/files/green_energy_technology_file.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/6176/3480/files/amiga_1200_manual.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/1057/2967/files/febrile_seizure_aap_guidelines.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • https://savannah.gnu.org/projects/freefont/
    • http://www.gnu.org/licenses/
    • http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000603f.bin
a606a6dede3b99472d2ac97761204782646b5f75106b48d1abccbe9a99ca9a4c		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x603F 6440 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007033.bin
5e6cdf9f609d75d2d43b70269b70a90a538eb4a078f0875fbd1c5a5c5301377b		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7033 5120 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00008181.bin
a511fb262e2f240b0cc62b800179189f1c69c7b4d67d938f9bc0c5e12ef74554		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8181 2024 bytes
font_03_sfnt_off00008b16.bin
b0d2b4754abbb550071b2fd8fe78fa7e43e71abbf7577d79d17bd12ecb9a2455		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8B16 12092 bytes
font_04_sfnt_off0000b271.bin
15973f72624efb622f2b7a5a9e5f0f4a1b0b039e341388d34a351ecda8223419		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB271 16100 bytes

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