Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 150bf1f62fcafd99…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

327.5 KB Created: 2020-11-30 12:22:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: b5794abad9f02dd82f7390d94055fa15 SHA-1: da404fbe7a7cb07ab6d26f4530cd5e4feb020e87 SHA-256: 150bf1f62fcafd9955aeb7f0c9dda3716f5252e12644a52a0851bed7bf7e23f1
190 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a VBA macro that executes upon opening the document, indicated by the 'Document_Open' and 'OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC' heuristics. This macro likely uses Windows Script Host (SC_STR_WSCRIPT) and GetObject calls to download and execute a second-stage payload from one of the embedded URLs. The presence of VBA macros and the execution of code via the Document_Open event strongly suggest a macro-based malware delivery mechanism, commonly associated with spearphishing attachments.

Heuristics 7

  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://sapunuri.samargelim.ro/phpThumb/new_cache/4/40/Cb3RFhZq.php
    • https://babor-kosmetik-steglitz.de/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/nfO6vyCm.php
    • https://gpu.utepils.es/v2/lib/ErrorHandler/public/EWbJwE6eMn.php
    • https://buy.manairge.com/img/news/video/yoKHoSxL8p1.php
    • https://consultorio.web3sites.net/sistemaonline/upload/js/cors/5BC8unmEd9.php
    • http://sniezka-6.test.etriton.pl/wp-includes/js/jquery/ui/Cs3xTXhrij.php
    • http://www.alfenory.net/alfenory_erp.de/frontaccounting/purchasing/allocations/REbrGXIrn5Ewu5.php
    • https://hub.2mind.com.br/uploads/mind004/images/spN6GOXQUlKjNn.php
    • http://swarajcollegeofeducation.com/a4content/a4progallery/nt5asQtUwL.php
    • http://dna.1key.win/mysql/locale/pt_BR/LC_MESSAGES/ieBUxi2PXfapVpE.php
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
09ad5280d792e9f4970d35380e46ecef7d89d7a9cd754383a66de6c195f4ffbf		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 20005 bytes

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