Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 14f82f6182a47552…

MALICIOUS

PDF

45.7 KB Created: 2020-10-14 21:44:03 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-15
MD5: bca9ed3530f4f6d91c839b15be98311d SHA-1: 2a1507995ad7686041a4257c69543cd66869f3d5 SHA-256: 14f82f6182a475521dff9645d80941c22f3456873b94c728da4d02ec6df3f816
184 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=asahi+pentax+k1000+user+manual In PDF document text
    • https://dutitujazekap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814390/7971455.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xumogimunosu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131607683/munaziruzaxuw-wowomulurodi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dutitujazekap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814390/36ce75ac.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xojerajap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384359/70b5e2514cc.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jawasolasazilem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379174/zuvefusu_tewojawowebav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rewemekekebaz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406535/5019697.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nobinetezo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969761/2681029.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dutitujazekap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814390/1158663.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wepugimi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070973/jujalow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037096.mozfiles.com/files/1037096/wekusofenumebegabivi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039182.mozfiles.com/files/1039182/70253935430.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039597.mozfiles.com/files/1039597/94657919797.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1043134.mozfiles.com/files/1043134/betelidisuzunako.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039753.mozfiles.com/files/1039753/58874196687.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1043576.mozfiles.com/files/1043576/dynamic_programming_algorithm_examples.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1040210.mozfiles.com/files/1040210/petobiwumevopop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0483/7113/8711/files/87963105279.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0499/8293/1112/files/dw_6900_battery.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0266/8996/2167/files/mizogorixevuvolazivosutov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000072ee.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x72EE 5372 bytes
SHA-256: e7d60db626b8211e4cf33979b0bebb2b4124392c96eb3f53b32d439b1f594f03
font_01_sfnt_off00008505.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8505 10836 bytes
SHA-256: 49be87c4de3ad00d74430a2d9d61d99eec6324c8064ce11edb72fbd6200802b4

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