Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 14f73cfcb1d63493…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

22.4 KB
MD5: ab6c0bed424ecfa5fb3e12d2db6cd900 SHA-1: 5000499ab283e98530920937012d87153048bbae SHA-256: 14f73cfcb1d6349374833372961d540b53a6b7ffc628e0d7f6c56f870d365581
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. This technique is commonly used to achieve arbitrary code execution, which in turn is often used to download and execute further malicious content. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics further supports the exploitation of embedded objects.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001d44.bin
36edd739f80a16a09759aa8985d85c6a981ba79a36ecb32e16a58535e3917401
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1D44 1866 bytes