RTF malware analysis — malicious · 14ea26a775bf7cd9

MALICIOUS

RTF

63.5 KB First seen: 2024-07-10

MD5: f48645f93407473fccd3d921827b876e SHA-1: 9d81d6c22da289fc2b04c0f7cef803debccbf72d SHA-256: 14ea26a775bf7cd9c438c726ec846bf9cdce4d76c918ad5ed3774376b0de3619

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is an RTF document containing OLE object data, specifically triggering heuristics related to Equation Editor exploitation. The presence of \objupdate suggests that the embedded OLE object is designed to be activated automatically, likely leading to the execution of a malicious payload. The exploitation of Equation Editor is a known technique for initial code execution, often used to download and run further stages of malware.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001b16.bin` `b1dca73e9c891fd17458176cecb68e66d1f3b902cde1738804a88af479620e11`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1B16	1248 bytes

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