Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 14b56729f25081be…

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.1 KB Created: 2021-04-02 00:50:45 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-25
MD5: c839404e60ae1238593be79b989e508f SHA-1: 294debd0dd2b098de5eadc3c4711096c792deefd SHA-256: 14b56729f25081bef2e8cd17eccd4b8ff73e435f361a4c4bed771d142f8afd1b
126 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains an embedded URI pointing to a suspicious domain, identified by heuristics as a link farm and flagged by ML classifiers and ClamAV as malicious. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, appears to be a lure related to 'popular st bernard names' to entice users to click the malicious link. No scripts were extracted, but the presence of external URIs and the overall detection profile strongly suggest a phishing or scam campaign.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ponafet.ru/strik?utm_term=popular+st+bernard+names PDF link annotation
    • http://xofawewojego.22web.org/centurion_d5_gate_motor_manual.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://remont-kholodilnikov.website/how_to_adjust_shimano_di2_shiftingo0mam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/jebumujo/L7if8LD/steam_gift_card_email_delivery_walmart.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/dewufidabo/ifhb9GS/goporugaxabiwe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pitoxur.iblogger.org/28224436226.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lulumel.66ghz.com/88648145273.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4478932/normal_604205874351f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hookup753.fun/mcgraw_hill_connect_answer_key_financial_accountingv7r08.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://toximakuvox.iblogger.org/soboxoxoves.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366325/normal_601518093543f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/kubepugemaki/jgVia1w/fejinudoxexunofewevugomiz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4417643/normal_6012472f2a6a4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/desekusoxi/7_continents_worksheets.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://savejanaxejov.rf.gd/daxenifefofurovojopepiba.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xuraperen.epizy.com/the_very_hungry_caterpillar_download.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://koroxep.rf.gd/43897161621.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xekokopadupino.rf.gd/solekovep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gagotaniwipure/10820486413.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wufalejopasedor.epizy.com/formal_agreements_with_other_countries.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xunilukegez/plato_republic_gutenberg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f01d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF01D 5248 bytes
SHA-256: dc91b922bcd285db3cfb760d59ad4abb15b13e0b39284eb573389653cc80b1a7
font_01_sfnt_off000101cc.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x101CC 11132 bytes
SHA-256: ec0638d9f6d61b6b98252b02c24528643aeb74c37a969abe35416702424e4078

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