Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 14a58beb592bd357…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOCX

986.5 KB Created: 2021-06-24 10:39:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 1315c4ca88d5eb8e4363e843dd0c3292 SHA-1: dd8a13467bb60e6f5893aeb242bedd34be67983a SHA-256: 14a58beb592bd357e373e99ad1c07ee497271419d742bdd35e35b5ab41ea8eaa
682 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This Office document contains a VBA macro with a Document_Open auto-execution subroutine. The macro attempts to download a DLL file named 'kikus.dll' into the user's template path and then execute it using ShellExecuteA. The embedded executable and the extracted DLL are flagged by ClamAV as malicious, indicating a downloader or dropper functionality.

Heuristics 18

  • Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high CVE related OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECT
    OLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is CVE-2007-3893/MS07-046-family evidence when paired with Office exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed EMF record is not proven by this rule alone.
  • OLE with Ole10Native — possible CVE-2026-21514 exploitation high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Document contains a Word OLE object with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. CVE-2026-21514 exploits OLE metadata validation; this stronger structure is treated as likely exploitation.
  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • ClamAV: Win.Packed.Johnnie-10034316-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Packed.Johnnie-10034316-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • PEB access via FS segment (x86) high SC_PEB_ACCESS
    PEB access via FS segment (x86)
  • Reference to ShellExecute API high SC_STR_SHELLEXEC
    Reference to ShellExecute API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Reference to VirtualProtect API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALPROTECT
    Reference to VirtualProtect API
  • Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro sheet present medium OLE_XLM_AUTOOPEN
    Workbook contains an Excel 4.0 macro sheet sub-stream — XLM is rarely seen in modern legitimate workbooks and was a major Office malware vector during 2020-2022.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
ad427da8430d0bab4b976c0aa215ff17485db4f0e31aee29dd87b9d86837c45d		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2742 bytes
embedded_office_0008ee71.exe
c06a86c691886440daecd66d81aa3437f284b14ca908fe060743d6844b923536		 embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x8EE71 424847 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Packed.Midie-10008727-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
ole10native_00.bin
cc688cb9c05fe9d581ad0981852893e047f510e0d4602a20a46ef13b067df912		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1686011362/Ole10Native 384309 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Packed.Johnnie-10034316-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

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