Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 149b96ed69ab5b59…

MALICIOUS

PDF

69.3 KB Created: 2020-11-26 02:02:53 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 956088ef462d5f25cd5416bd8bfd98f6 SHA-1: d180daf217222f543a454105293df20a9a321b84 SHA-256: 149b96ed69ab5b59e123fcdd0d134e3cf9c4a66802f1b5c5097e90bb44e02f9f
126 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffine.ru/strik?utm_term=bosquejo+de+ideas+en+redacci%25C3%25B3n
    • https://jumolemema.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134853288/sotanumodunukid.pdf
    • https://zuzotupewumu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134691050/15e184.pdf
    • https://xepajozojiv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134476610/7326794.pdf
    • https://bafovulik.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070506/1945366.pdf
    • https://jakedekokobara.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381480/divili_dapixi.pdf
    • https://wigotimobegevuj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134312632/vugosovuwedanatojun.pdf
    • https://mepubigavij.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134599646/xodogitivomeb-mozope-tumuwiv.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/5104f828-0baa-4017-a889-d406258187c3/napusenumu.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/rivazixexuguri/evaluating_trig_functions_worksheet.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/5c28d607-aa40-40aa-a993-8238a6ca87d8/free_simple_business_plan_template.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b8602525-7931-46b6-aa9f-bd9e9990341f/81598116066.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d022.bin
935c95bacd4004dc84ae0e3e18a70515335d32a6b9a26e766d28c225730a2aef		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD022 5288 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000e1f0.bin
25980cf5d2ed3336f122df981180a0fe2e116a302a71f7c8342a053e59001de7		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE1F0 11208 bytes

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