MALICIOUS
240
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
The RTF document contains multiple indicators of malicious OLE object embedding, specifically related to CVE-2017-8570, which is known to drop SCT scripts. The document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'enable editing' to view the content, a common tactic for macro-enabled malicious documents. The presence of OLE object data and composite monikers strongly suggests an attempt to execute embedded code, likely a second-stage payload.
Heuristics 7
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Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) critical CVE_2017_8570RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
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Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATEDRTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
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Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINKRTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
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\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATERTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
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OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATARTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
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Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMBRTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
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Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LUREDocument instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
Extracted artifacts 4
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
objdata_00_off00000965.binfe2d63f545c7e7640031a8bdb54295fbba3ff1c6075793840592e8f593ea03ea |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x965 | 56437 bytes |
objdata_01_off00007114.bin5fdce7e20144c9864fbd4b0af9cf720ac2c5b7a3f3553f2f09163faf141ece9f |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x7114 | 56410 bytes |
objdata_02_off00023c09.bina8e170497da15decc11753d202c99c86f7a7ffd2d52481e6b9c79a5403675379 |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x23C09 | 2632 bytes |
objdata_03_off000251ac.bine8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7 |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x251AC | 12297 bytes |
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