Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 147ff22bdcef3aa7…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.6 KB
MD5: 385d9d7dce288d12688ad65b0c262f0b SHA-1: abb40f1e00da3e6613d81c54d8f995e57b5f27ea SHA-256: 147ff22bdcef3aa73f1f3231fd85310f55b02535f2921db4e39dc84954f4faae
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. This indicates an attempt to exploit a client execution vulnerability, likely delivered as a spearphishing attachment. No further IOCs were extracted from the static analysis.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000a0.bin
cd23aa782b20140bef5af33865573a4d84280217bcab4865789bd588c2a340db
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA0 1627 bytes