Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1456b5fb11fe6268…

MALICIOUS

RTF

15.6 KB First seen: 2020-07-02
MD5: 3fc1bfc5d3d0143a30ada5bf18fa76ef SHA-1: 65a6d9347760b11963e86bb1eab821ec63a3472c SHA-256: 1456b5fb11fe6268a6321f033e31ed78ac91e5e8163850942760fad2542c7084
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains OLE object data and triggers heuristics for the Equation Editor vulnerability, indicating exploitation for client execution. The presence of ".objupdate" further suggests that the embedded OLE object is forced to activate. This is a common method for delivering malicious payloads, likely via spearphishing attachments.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000119c.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x119C 1272 bytes
SHA-256: 62cb0fd11b6b1f30b618a1a901f8a04c39a32ca2728ba90ddc951d1aa82c4a83

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