Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 144645a609459358…

MALICIOUS

PDF

45.0 KB Created: 2020-07-09 16:08:00 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-09-07
MD5: c18896fd402ef509638cc2f118e91683 SHA-1: b936058de296055690abe1434e127c5b75947521 SHA-256: 144645a609459358ec000a93b4678af1c8fc3e8e31a13f15fc1f26a4f6a95a36
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document contains a deceptive lure, presenting itself as a stroller manual, but its primary function is to host a large number of links. These links are designed to redirect users to potentially malicious websites, as indicated by the PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK heuristic. The ML classifier also strongly flagged this PDF as malicious, suggesting a high likelihood of malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wb?keyword=graco%20click%20connect%20stroller%20jogger%20manual In PDF document text
    • http://files.myelegantmarriage.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606819/lijukudamina.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.tylermoorefilms.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131071056/29413422db.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.chefmanny.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682290/xulit.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.haywardfitnessfanatics.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874413/dugen.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.derekwarnerphotography.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437832/783d1b86.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.mhsamerican.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132741571/7814391.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.stephanieheger.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070289/9317508.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.meriyaatra.net/uploads/1/3/2/7/132712174/xajitesabuzeko_bawenude_vizuvamutelo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.dlfinancial.org/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379749/tobij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://doraxosonar.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/fududukatukakem.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bijojaraduk.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/46079267376.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://miruziburofu.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/41510812707.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://doraxurewaz.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/71980755001.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xesigifi.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/finos.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tomozajip.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/33930909594.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://patepekugi.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/tulibulopeb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/1369814796.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/pejuzesuloroxutebed.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/vawis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000633e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x633E 5172 bytes
SHA-256: 29e99d27f5b0b0b71e6d3797c14b7f5fdac08edce58a5b8c27ffb7a675c31f08
font_01_sfnt_off000074c8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x74C8 16232 bytes
SHA-256: d843217cd79bc2fce6dc46c2c8f867a6e87e8b0dd891a9e4ca052fb2feb08a11

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