Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 143d3bc0338aacbb…

MALICIOUS

PDF

34.2 KB Created: 2020-05-24 08:45:01 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 7c8a8526d064e9829e9f920decd3baf8 SHA-1: bb127e5cf634c1a00437d91f38840207e9a2a4c8 SHA-256: 143d3bc0338aacbb5023506e4a3a1749cccddafda392d5b1f2b0443159ec8e74
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many of which point to other PDF files hosted on various domains. The document body and embedded links suggest a lure for downloading content, likely to distribute further malicious payloads. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, and the PDF structure with numerous external links is characteristic of SEO spam or link farm techniques used to distribute malware.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://esayouthsports.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438622/131438622.html#k%25C3%25BCrt%25C3%25A7e+mevl%25C3%25BCt+indir+bedava
    • http://mcluskeypr.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856062/3017479.pdf
    • http://windowonart.net/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871439/1f693e91ac7cd14.pdf
    • http://face-me.net/uploads/1/3/0/6/130639779/1326575.pdf
    • http://feedtheneedy.net/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381411/ba6bf11.pdf
    • http://palmsapparelco.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130621776/mixazidibika_xebawowufax_rujoralupise.pdf
    • http://faithfulmedicalsolutions.com/uploads/1/3/0/4/130476538/2664358.pdf
    • http://usaglobalinstitute.org/uploads/1/3/1/4/131455663/fd409.pdf
    • http://terriersagainsttrump.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130590261/0cf14752.pdf
    • http://asurionmwc.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130588216/5101457.pdf
    • http://getcoveredhouston.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453323/xusawawobimikesaxumi.pdf
    • http://stephenho.org/uploads/1/3/0/2/130271072/zofunusof-kemugasos-nazivegow.pdf
    • http://zukup.pl/uploads/1/3/0/5/130539642/gudimesumewe.pdf
    • http://samanthajcpierce.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130546283/nofoxokaj-vofowopem-zowamuru-poseledixe.pdf
    • http://movingfwdministries.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776025/kudumux.pdf
    • http://coachingvan.com/uploads/1/3/0/3/130313504/7561717.pdf
    • http://daletnyc.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814133/2680e337f193.pdf
    • http://southernfertilityandsurgery.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637606/d2823d511ad16b.pdf
    • http://hostmaster.sugarrosecakedesign.co.uk/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381539/7520859.pdf
    • http://inclusivejourneys.com/uploads/1/3/0/4/130483062/savinefeteboje_dafajiruwitu_xuvami.pdf
    • http://missusvicarious.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873730/34d3f9f36.pdf
    • http://slpkeys.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874658/kugalixaguba.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005690.bin
15b958a56a9116fece4239c8618b46693ba016bf16000da1fe45f809f30ff000		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5690 11560 bytes

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