Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 142e9a988e323425…

MALICIOUS

PDF

48.3 KB Created: 2020-08-17 02:44:56 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: d965884b54daa7e17e0a0c43b45f322a SHA-1: 752e9e1e5f005f2bda46076e8dcb348565320e43 SHA-256: 142e9a988e3234250f9954dc466d0d19ba37a415d9962f35205eb0903ae41af0
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains multiple heuristics indicating malicious intent, including a link to a known malicious redirector and a large number of external PDF links, suggesting a link farm. The presence of a 'download button' lure and password instructions for an archive further supports a malicious workflow. The embedded URL 'https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=bypass+free++apk' is the primary indicator of a potential phishing or malware distribution attempt.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=bypass+free++apk
    • http://gipakumit.lutateacher.org/uploads/1/3/1/1/131163635/3209999.pdf
    • http://ratel.yorkshire-rail.co.uk/uploads/1/3/1/6/131607062/nivotasukobel_litabob.pdf
    • http://files.candacegayle.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740573/2891096.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/7243/7910/files/74113696440.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/4014/4534/files/54134474827.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/3712/0933/files/zazoboxenutavimitawugobet.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/8466/1414/files/99388792602.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/7772/9432/files/39526441528.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/5476/8032/files/35200588881.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/2994/5758/files/59133367715.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/0695/0550/files/arifureta_novela_descargar.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/0617/1048/files/39341312442.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/5747/8823/files/wutibudorusebaluzawuwiluw.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000071c4.bin
86702cb64145fe0d243e000a326bdb4a8de9f40e0d2d30fe7e0c122756284c5e		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x71C4 4520 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000812c.bin
8f7de47ee8dcbc9a6057fa99897923b046278bc4a9532894e116ef49b4a77e6c		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x812C 10860 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000a645.bin
cd94ef65598b1866d0653cdd88243d989fd81359c0e770c2d3a4858f1c2f6d34		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA645 4324 bytes

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