RTF malware analysis — malicious · 142c6a4c7e9efbf6

MALICIOUS

RTF

17.7 KB First seen: 2024-07-29

MD5: 2462db3be57df824f003f74d7a16cacb SHA-1: d7086ef6bf35e1c360af522e3bc0e19fa6184b70 SHA-256: 142c6a4c7e9efbf6f3176df3ff218449bb4f7b2a69d60060e6339f1c3cc95d93

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering critical heuristics related to Equation Editor exploitation. The \objupdate directive indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically upon opening, likely leading to the execution of a malicious payload. This is a common delivery mechanism for exploiting vulnerabilities like CVE-2017-11882.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00002c65.bin` `cd9f419917a162cbbd3e595cee35b4179f28f2d4493d7b058beb272be882b29b`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2C65	3108 bytes
`objdata_01_off00002c91.bin` `1bbdc1728ce188e9e49d4fa8bc39b0b9c82eeb10d1c08ba27e38872eaec498c5`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2C91	36 bytes

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