Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 141c8d4b830cd941…

MALICIOUS

PDF

81.8 KB Created: 2021-03-17 19:01:55 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-20
MD5: af2b8437a39ca2b602842a5fa9ff800b SHA-1: 81a025aacc1cd16b05f9be841187763bb398b19c SHA-256: 141c8d4b830cd941ccf4ab2932f9701b14410f1052c9430c58a7fc533f8240ed
306 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript that attempts to lure the user into executing commands, specifically mentioning 'powershell script'. Heuristics indicate social engineering tactics like 'ClickFix' and 'Clipboard command execution lure', instructing the user to paste commands into a terminal. The embedded script and heuristics strongly suggest the document's purpose is to facilitate the execution of a malicious payload via PowerShell.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9993

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://dugedepap.ru/strik?utm_term=how+to+start+powershell+script PDF link annotation
    • http://sopafekidis.sportsontheweb.net/padafilewu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vojonabof.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383251/memodezokadasitebova.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • https://xasevezivim.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135302984/runudovodaroga-zexexiwari-jebad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kujisasu.iblogger.org/laboratory_report_writing_format.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nexipufogavajid.getenjoyment.net/adapted_physical_education_and_sport_5th_edition_download.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mamubisuk.mypressonline.com/rilumaraxo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fudazozotakaxal.mywebcommunity.org/catching_fire_novel_plot.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wigobike.sportsontheweb.net/pearson_pre_calculus_12.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zikuwojanubeg.iblogger.org/ronijimivexoruge.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bimevaxufozuz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132683359/96c9d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sopafekidis.sportsontheweb.net/padaIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f00cfb3c-e6ff-4e83-8a5e-e1fcea0b42e3/6924136663.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wurivuve/89476278495.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zugutixe/69881863680.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/figugipopar/how_to_turn_on_onn_bluetooth_headphones.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://venakato.epizy.com/julofojafusofeneviji.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/912e68f6-ed8f-44e1-915f-83fc5bab82e7/how_to_fill_out_a_basic_lease_agreement.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kufekisawisewo.onlinewebshop.net/guvimadujez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ca2cd5ec-9827-4648-bfef-45d560952550/48856406050.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/01e78b79-a912-489b-8a85-0dbdace644f4/fanututet.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://majezomisi.myartsonline.com/arabic_to_english_words_meaning.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://masemipeba.myartsonline.com/78642645940.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/kotidox/old_tappan_gas_oven_parts.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/pujirageg/99830015265.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dufojamimusim.atwebpages.com/ihip_drift_speaker_instructions.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lowazuxakosilal.epizy.com/giradiva.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_000141f6.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x141F6 1591 bytes
SHA-256: a73d6354a1b614a2b969d720216b9346327a24506f7bcf406b92543e7c3e16e0
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 7 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='Inkscape'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Cosidezata Tupeyi</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>How to start powershell script.   If you’re new to the PowerShell scripting language and want to learn how to run a PowerShell scrip</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>How to start powershell script.   If you’re new to the PowerShell scripting language and want to learn how to run a PowerShell scrip</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>How to start powershell script</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='Inkscape'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-01-17T17:20:38'
  xmp:CreatorTool='Inkscape'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='d6cf8191-ab18-4793-bfa5-b3611b5c262c'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='50b40f8c-dcaa-4f1d-9650-ba9b1c11d289'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000feff.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFEFF 5076 bytes
SHA-256: ba8f27efbb3152ff1227e01a5bfb589529b6d8bf731a26a587b31c2cc6e4c41e
font_01_sfnt_off0001104c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1104C 11700 bytes
SHA-256: 7baf388052fa7d3bb4ef0d48c026405962637f1b428e97db063f5854b2a1c29a

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