Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 13f9f6fbc09b49a4…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

142.0 KB Created: 2015-06-05 18:17:20 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: ed6e1cdb466dd3a05a964a2f9a678f92 SHA-1: 6efb157ee19a7a1269deb34e686013e01bfe7e31 SHA-256: 13f9f6fbc09b49a4138785410cf1e50ef4f0213721c1eefcdb861c7aa9a3e04a
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains VBA macros that are configured to execute automatically upon opening the workbook. These macros leverage CreateObject to interact with the system, specifically referencing Wscript.Shell and Scripting.FileSystemObject. The primary function appears to be downloading and executing a second-stage payload from a list of 11 embedded URLs, as indicated by the OLE_VBA_CELL_DROPPER_URL heuristic. The reconstructed command line in the document body also points to the execution of a batch file and a VBScript, likely part of the payload delivery chain.

Heuristics 8

  • URL reconstructed from VBA cell-staged base64 dropper (11 URLs) critical OLE_VBA_CELL_DROPPER_URL
    VBA reads worksheet cells, strips junk substrings via Replace(), and base64/UTF-16 decodes the result into a PowerShell EncodedCommand payload. The download URL is never contiguous in the file bytes; it was recovered by removing the macro's Replace() junk tokens from the cell strings and decoding the staged base64.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Valyria-10004384-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Valyria-10004384-0
  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://goyaluat.vmesh.in/0v6kcny/CG/
    • https://mars.srl/wp-admin/7Ffk6LLN2Xs2W/
    • http://franmulero.es/mbx/8c5RBJx6/
    • http://varafood.com/Ajax/cnM91G/
    • https://7jcat.com/wp-content/t/
    • http://blog.centralhome.h
    • http://zimrights.co.zw/oldsite/k0EoCWycU9tNo1d/
    • https://mudhands.com/error/BfH/
    • http://albatrospatagonia.com/phkcvt/t53ceSMDqgPQlq/
    • http://mapcommunications.co.zw/wp-admin/mdRRbSdU3aB7Xpx6z/
    • http://dushkin.net/img/bhQSTNicEMtNQxP/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
527d0656a0c2c323955d068683ef8f7e20c035cda247a1e24383595c0eb3403b		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 7821 bytes

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