Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 13f3b069fc620c25…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.6 KB
MD5: f3a76a6d2b1832060c759bcbe36841b0 SHA-1: ab086577b66a9e9594cceb806af3107886e6f498 SHA-256: 13f3b069fc620c25a9521799bb5f3109f8699887ec0eba38f3b317e7eae754cf
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. This indicates an attempt to exploit a client execution vulnerability, likely delivered as a spearphishing attachment. The embedded OLE object data is the primary indicator of compromise.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000d1.bin
e29fe1122b2a4a757dfb37238feb70e4f435eb9c8b384dfa6ce693d500c18237
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD1 2029 bytes