Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 13d8605745b10432…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

79.4 KB First seen: 2023-08-07
MD5: 2c6c2c3fbdd819ee45b543d6632f842f SHA-1: 2d457867c3a63c535dd22df1004d0e9d219b6960 SHA-256: 13d8605745b104326328cc687fff7b529449c6ea732edc7e6f42d2c33af7858b
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that contains OLE object data and specifically targets the Equation Editor, a known vector for exploitation. The presence of \objupdate further indicates an attempt to trigger the embedded OLE object. The document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'click Enable editing', which is a common tactic for macro-based malware droppers to bypass security settings.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000041bf.bin
62d389338754256d273d0e5c145c0d57df677f5ea628ade900c59d7984daf12c
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x41BF 2054 bytes