Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 13d7c3e00c410176…

MALICIOUS

RTF

89.9 KB First seen: 2023-08-14
MD5: f1edf20e37a90edcd8992ae17a686d2e SHA-1: 22655399fb530e797da924d20071bf299d11b22c SHA-256: 13d7c3e00c41017615b7aa10cb44ceb52af91a80380bcf65cbeb4dc9edcc6d25
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The ".objupdate" directive forces OLE activation, and the document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing'. This combination strongly suggests a malicious document designed to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability upon opening.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000029fa.bin
734224292d240cdbbd7edda2ec391a9726b22afe26f0467921687e317f8a9d36
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x29FA 1969 bytes