Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 13ba7d40a2b483bd…

MALICIOUS

RTF

12.0 KB
MD5: e875dcafaecaba72e8eb95d3d785c994 SHA-1: 7525ebe6511728b04010a8b46edf0ca6115232df SHA-256: 13ba7d40a2b483bd278a526c6c67f5988e1d53ffdec5398398dad6f0035da174
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that exploits a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor (RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR). The ".bin" file extracted from the OLE object likely contains a second-stage payload. The presence of the objdata heuristic and the specific RTF structure strongly suggests exploitation for client execution, likely leading to a downloader or dropper.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001b59.bin
7aa73042174bf9805cb093b1f3e9c3b931b1e9fba9957fb895d1aa9cb120cfcb
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1B59 1910 bytes