Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 13952c36ff62b97e…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

16.8 KB
MD5: b2cc8d9f397fc63b47b6a8fc6b263263 SHA-1: 18a8e8f678f4f82fc19966074f5d2055b0b08994 SHA-256: 13952c36ff62b97edaaa48649874cf5a353f9646ae29218e28908365c8ac6c7a
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document containing embedded OLE object data, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR, and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics strongly indicates exploitation of this component. This technique is commonly used to achieve arbitrary code execution, typically for downloading and executing a subsequent stage.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000016c3.bin
fc9ec5a89db20f3e7d92337bdf2eeedd9c605dec66490c78b6d0e2741d9a0552
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x16C3 1479 bytes