Emotet — Office (OLE) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1376ccfbd0ddc8fb…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

158.5 KB
MD5: 19a31786b3b41c54c2ac8c2f0661b5e4 SHA-1: 085b3f38d2b1f274785f6b7b9aaf7a9f9dcf002a SHA-256: 1376ccfbd0ddc8fbd523d646b424e2436d96e7a7dbebf71d16ac4e54cef4624d
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing obfuscated VBA macros, specifically a Document_Open auto-exec macro. Heuristics indicate it uses CreateObject and execution sinks, typical of downloaders. ClamAV detection confirms it as 'Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed0121-9822961-0', strongly suggesting Emotet family activity. The VBA script's primary function appears to be decoding and executing a payload, likely from an external source.

Heuristics 7

  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed0121-9822961-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed0121-9822961-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
8a462910f65fc057e90c745908924da5be2f067f062e45a5cb003ffd787ee4a6
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 13488 bytes