Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 135e6e64bd7742b3…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

132.6 KB Created: 2020-01-29 06:24:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 69f2aa8e265b0a19c125471c5c43ef0e SHA-1: f942e141f11540a1a3a387fad48df8329f46d4d8 SHA-256: 135e6e64bd7742b372ada6b825319eb55fa6081a563f2bb5b8c41b146badb7e9
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The file is an OOXML document containing VBA macros, specifically a Document_Open macro that calls GetObject. This is a common pattern for macro-based malware downloaders. ClamAV also detected it as 'Doc.Downloader.Mrwx-7567136-0'. While no direct download URLs or executable artifacts were found in the provided evidence, the presence of the Document_Open macro and GetObject call strongly suggests the intent to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Mrwx-7567136-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Mrwx-7567136-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
f64587e64e299c8d38d4d0cfa07de72ed63f9c8db08395a6bcba7756bc0d404b		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 11080 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
d64eb3882249ac91b1445f17093d72cbb4f25ecd25c588aad9fa8d0a760d7d8f		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 69120 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Mrwx-7567136-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

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