Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 135dedf906bbb8ee…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

15.0 KB
MD5: ee6900ee7f29ffb8b1c5f5b9a8a117d0 SHA-1: 74501f04465f268c3f2bfea3b371118fe25b6aed SHA-256: 135dedf906bbb8eef7aef3b5966f1b933e65725cef80e653031481feb7351d62
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document containing OLE object data and specifically targets the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the embedded OLE object will be activated, leading to the exploitation of the Equation Editor. This is a common method for delivering second-stage malware.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000f3d.bin
4aa25343e9258dac78c9045c33aa173583ea7927602061b609ed9bfc032e0b46
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xF3D 1921 bytes