Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 13577e25446fa042…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

107.6 KB Created: 2020-12-17 03:19:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 6db0a03c3e21d4d9b30131793b5b5d24 SHA-1: dae7ed0e299c4ed442aab1018caec56a0bfe6c57 SHA-256: 13577e25446fa042fdd0163aaf33d9a8a8cf8bc27089130a4a46526e41c41e98
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains a VBA macro that executes upon opening the document. This macro utilizes the WScript.Shell COM object to download a second-stage payload from the Discord URL 'https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/781331413252702218/788957533103718451/m17.txt'. The script then attempts to save this payload to the user's temporary directory as 'llibNr.exe' and execute it. This behavior is indicative of a downloader or droppper malware.

Heuristics 6

  • VBA instantiates a dangerous COM class by CLSID critical OLE_VBA_GETOBJECT_CLSID_DANGEROUS
    VBA uses GetObject("new:{CLSID}") to instantiate an execution/scripting-capable COM class by its raw CLSID, avoiding the CreateObject ProgID that name-based detection keys on.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
71acc5d735158a55770ab90d9afe39f854e1b561ecd5370896eaf70c620041bb		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2420 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
fbc9d36af8df82f571367b621ae978a726009a6dd0129e0cd9cf16fd2452ea18		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 13824 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.