Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 134bf3eee1df913c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

145.5 KB Created: 2022-07-01 04:41:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-07-01
MD5: 5f2c68e99193d12d1faaf74cd8893679 SHA-1: 0aa98e640bff58823a9713b34c9443b72611f2ac SHA-256: 134bf3eee1df913ce48e2d80e60d9a0929930a20b43e48d188eb900597aa14e4
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing an embedded OLE object. This object is identified as an Ole10Native package that drops an auto-executable payload, specifically a JAR file. This indicates the document is designed to deliver and execute a secondary stage payload upon opening.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
bfa6078717f54ef7db8141ae4d558a08b8f9705bbcc01490225aa961f1040e23		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 120320 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.95, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
e510b3c56db4d7db6811aa8c619bbfb7ff64c2a05811cc4b369bbbc2b159e0c5		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 116710 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.99, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
fc23636b993d2606be7148de66bae879705c4cc7ea58104e50201d606d91d911		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5464 bytes

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