Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 13485b1be6ba339c…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

17.2 KB
MD5: 26265e8a3036e91c34728764a2645774 SHA-1: a9cf8145e05d6a2f51aa1cc092d8857203d26814 SHA-256: 13485b1be6ba339c9dcb83e4c7788930584ffcbf4bfde764a1ef4d2801702d90
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicative of the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate and \objdata heuristics further confirms the exploitation attempt. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution, likely leading to the download and execution of a secondary payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000112e.bin
542a0d03f0a359c4d9b4ce65c0f2e3908375f079aeda237d97ece1b7d3adc6a2		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x112E 1742 bytes

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