Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1334c087390fb946…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

39.4 KB Created: 2018-11-08 07:01:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 711eb1d89764d45f4ff2622143f744c2 SHA-1: 548b64c0f904733dd5433f6f3878487eeda54fa1 SHA-256: 1334c087390fb946c894c1863dfc9f0a659f594a3d6307fb48f24c30a23e0fc0
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

The sample is a malicious Office document containing an obfuscated VBA macro triggered by AutoOpen. The macro uses CreateObject to download a payload from 'https://christinadudley.com/public_html/cdudley/media/net/001/string.gif', saves it as '%temp%\n1.doc', and then executes it. This indicates a downloader or droppper functionality.

Heuristics 6

  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://christinadudley.com/public_html/cdudley/media/net/001/string.gif
    • https://christinadudley.com/public_html/cdudley/media/net/001/string.gif�
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
d72a04872be560f5f005b85474da2954dd3f8a028d3459c158c9ea0d34c8c0a8		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 905 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
add2a7f64efa22c4174bed6b620eb7402a33b2826f3717695e18af8cee7f6b52		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 13312 bytes

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