Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 132a53a42ec7c727…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.24 MB
MD5: 75990fe7c7bfbcd68e3641ced2d184a9 SHA-1: 1227f04860ae3d3137cd5e85b771cc6b339953a7 SHA-256: 132a53a42ec7c727a4eeef4013293ab2e4f3b42d82f7c608f15879dea2de338e
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that leverages the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED` heuristics strongly indicates exploitation of this known vulnerability for client-side execution. The `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristic suggests that the embedded object is configured to activate automatically, leading to code execution.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001116.bin
8b03efd0f5ea235096801a0645bfe1bf54d8530ad39e02ef1fc0b67afe8b81a9
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1116 27012 bytes
objdata_01_off0001cc29.bin
420dd98e97f2838b69fef2f6d85eff987f569ee4001ae1d6183f751f72b4b727
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1CC29 480330 bytes