Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1323759eaa0add5e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

411.6 KB Created: 2008-01-30 12:43:16 +01:00 Authoring application: Acrobat PDFMaker 6.0 for PowerPoint (via Acrobat Distiller 6.0 (Windows))
MD5: 9ec1fb0b43039c4801f8ded8b6be4071 SHA-1: 626f4a2e5e7d345ed4d4a1ffa6f34ea16f310cb6 SHA-256: 1323759eaa0add5e0ee85c3124f4c88753568b22b8bf68d0ff673e5b4a30c821
524 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that utilizes the `exportDataObject` function, which is known to be used for launching embedded executables. This, combined with the PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND heuristic indicating `cmd.exe` execution and the embedded PE payload, strongly suggests an exploit targeting Adobe Reader to execute a secondary payload. The embedded artifact is named 'tema3.pdf' but is detected as a Windows executable by ClamAV.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9983

Heuristics 13

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\tema3.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Optional Content Group with action trigger low PDF_OPTIONAL_CONTENT
    Optional Content Group (layer) co-occurs with an action trigger — content can be selectively hidden from viewers or scanners while the action still fires on open
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdfx/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • https://www.verisign.com/repository/CPS��
    • https://www.verisign.com
    • https://www.verisign.com/repository/verisignlogo.gif0��
    • https://www.verisign.com/CPS0b
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography
    • http://www.iec.ch

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
tema3.pdf
a86d9b272e3c9fbcf55eab0f1911f211e5b76fdc16d839f202ccbd2545ca1ea2		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 802 at offset 0x65DF5 5120 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Packed.Sbdbat2exe-9850863-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
javascript_obj0803_000.js
901c2ee096069106d88276420f30ca640610a25f42d12cfd1a5df814f197a4aa		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 803 at offset 0x665D4 54 bytes
stream_096_off00057821.bin
225f31309db64707a970661c649c4e75e0030f13d1fb3d53986aac0074989dc4		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x57821 11268 bytes
icc_00_off0000233b.icc
2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e		 pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x233B 3144 bytes

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