Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 131cb480338af4d8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.9 KB Created: 2020-09-01 08:10:47 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 60fe7851f97920c2b694b1bb5d4b82fd SHA-1: a2daff3b0d273f5e5dd3e04f746a6f3af6173353 SHA-256: 131cb480338af4d810ffe85bd51209fc8c4ffd08666eb24c6286804a9286d148
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains a lure to execute commands via the clipboard, indicated by the 'SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE' heuristic. It also links to a known malicious redirector at 'https://ttraff.ru/wix?keyword=kali+linux+windows+10'. The combination of these factors suggests an attempt to trick the user into running malicious code, likely as part of a spearphishing campaign.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wix?keyword=kali+linux+windows+10
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0454/1775/8888/files/backgammon_rules.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/1796/9570/files/gadareda.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/2305/6545/files/division_bacillariophyta.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/8699/3813/files/benefits_of_livestock_farming.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/4186/5384/files/convert_file_to_word_doc_for_free.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/f0f215_37ea9f9c9d93470fac4579ad7e5c3b3a.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/1f6d71_d3d483f3781d47429eb836239dc8bcdf.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b91566_2743c5237f7749a59d23242bb84a1848.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_ffb888ccdff74888b90bfa85a1dd202f.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b58d21_7dec0d28c08748938adf0866c3f1c823.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_ba1f802286d44e0090a49df6032326b3.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/bfbc46_a9ca6551621d4bd2aab11192161c4aa7.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/f1d680_854f36c9cca2422381fc4f7ee09fc490.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/cfa91a_3d23bcecf06646beb61eb287f2a185b7.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/a107db_7db7a0e819384988a1f07bec61ab2d20.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/4636/2527/files/55603521317.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5844/5979/files/varelujitoxidavemuwufox.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/8770/8825/files/implosion_never_lose_hope_full_mod_apk.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0440/2541/3782/files/68732807532.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006e05.bin
34819cd08de9a5926ca1bb4819ce8ee701e3557c825980511bc2acb0297e0657		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6E05 5048 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007f65.bin
78354ca1952f50dddba2b260c359095704c1f604cfb040e540caadd75c0a8645		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7F65 10176 bytes

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