Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1318c9713c909956…

MALICIOUS

RTF

2.9 KB First seen: 2020-05-25
MD5: da5a480f37dfb02fc55698a44b3e0cea SHA-1: af08d6cd17df8677c436241138d6dc8f73bb7756 SHA-256: 1318c9713c909956df001d89a606fbe5f545aeb4d3a617e7b712a239d8d54d57
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document containing OLE object data and a specific Equation Editor ProgID, indicating exploitation of a known vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The presence of \objupdate suggests the embedded OLE object is designed to be activated, likely to trigger the execution of malicious code. This pattern is commonly used to download and execute a secondary payload, hence the high confidence in exploitation for client execution.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000003c.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3C 1449 bytes
SHA-256: 8fb215550567335fb87a217fe95f3e462e7103fc1bd23b9ee3a6dd7e3f878cea