Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1308256f02595f5f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

1.95 MB Created: 2009-11-11 18:10:42 +03:00 Authoring application: bcComesMore (via b219f59c2dd596abfadbcecfc2277659)
MD5: 8aa2e32516783d3c749f65a8abdb2dcd SHA-1: ec264781c5a15cdd98ea6c4b061938427fdfd9ee SHA-256: 1308256f02595f5fd061d2bb6e2fe34d582d202379c8f44465329787fc7b3b0f
154 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF sample contains embedded JavaScript that utilizes an eval() call, a common technique for executing obfuscated or dynamically generated code. This JavaScript is likely responsible for exploiting a vulnerability within the PDF reader to download and execute a secondary payload. The ML classifier strongly indicates maliciousness, and the presence of JavaScript exploit cluster heuristics further supports this assessment.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9994

Heuristics 5

  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • eval() call high PDF_EVAL
    eval() found — commonly used for obfuscated exploit execution (matched inside decoded stream)
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Optional Content Group with action trigger low PDF_OPTIONAL_CONTENT
    Optional Content Group (layer) co-occurs with an action trigger — content can be selectively hidden from viewers or scanners while the action still fires on open

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0023_000.js
f37708ff70ebd7d6a32559faddcbe2ccdf64cca208250ff0a1a68218f4b532a1
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 23 at offset 0x36D1 4096 bytes
javascript_obj0024_001.js
b48fa8415f88f4de07311eb80d00092d07218f400e13b59496acbe06283492cb
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 24 at offset 0xC68E 39 bytes