Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 12ec3fd7177b0176…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.8 KB
MD5: a30e613c35cac684fe1a5713929c6d2c SHA-1: 63298c58fd74552e1077f6347ae16cfc4614b27d SHA-256: 12ec3fd7177b0176a6c1a1f611f62514299e769697ed70354ce4bfd215c22b01
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristic, indicating exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive forces OLE object activation, leading to arbitrary code execution. This is a common technique for delivering malicious payloads via email attachments.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000b7.bin
9ee178ba6dfc9690fea18ea79ddef27f345157e4a8fe66c218eca6c0c40ba9b9
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB7 1746 bytes