Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 12e86befa457b613…

MALICIOUS

PDF

81.9 KB Created: 2021-06-07 11:23:53 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-21
MD5: 9271bc2bfbfa025a0a6adf841da9194a SHA-1: d340091d65ad99eeb071624e783b44ac95452244 SHA-256: 12e86befa457b6131ff908dbb51a2efc893e97ddd0033a0c20b9048bca7b1a01
254 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF is designed to trick users into downloading further malicious content by impersonating a cloud document service and presenting a fake download button. It contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm or redirection scheme to deliver payloads. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9990

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Cloud document impersonation lure medium SE_CLOUD_DOC_LURE
    Document impersonates a cloud file-sharing service such as SharePoint, OneDrive, Google Drive, Dropbox, Box, or Microsoft 365 and asks the user to open, verify, or access a shared document
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://smidgel.ru/pbw?utm_term=how+to+bypass+google+drive+download+limit+for+shared+files+reddit PDF link annotation
    • https://befadileniralan.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/6/0/136082268/pigixuxifugifoge.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4418013/normal_6022e700e8acf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4403806/normal_601486b2aad49.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dodimugu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134483739/fakebazidasut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4403805/normal_6046e142a3fe6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4477156/normal_60613702ac89d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://defifipak.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134442047/1769382.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://momexifolel.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134319719/baxatesapovabogut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jatisarekitikez.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134661612/dodonolobuvu-numodonu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static-d.com/uploads/4474734/normal_60b26abb4ff38.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4372100/normal_5fdbe4a29cc71.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ratojomivufal.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453965/pakuzafokovori-getubujofawozo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nitowapesapu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134442046/23b1f75a576d5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4413362/normal_605d8c0403d85.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4412762/normal_605b3edf69ac3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lekinimogasujif.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739945/2eb9646dc4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://relujebaxarun.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164257/123117.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4404308/normal_5fd6fcd73533e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4427501/normal_60b90ab85e107.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ace822bc-37f5-4bbc-808e-cb6fb0cbd842/47783614430.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/8bb4241e-4637-4a9c-9c77-fbe93b0721bf/81961747886.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/7fe1c6f9-3156-4a93-8132-de416aab5106/92826718414.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/edb45914-63a0-4ced-8bc4-f8b970b81675/kosetevubagorexonodalur.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b00c03dd-4164-40a9-b2b7-79f083e7b5ab/224_valkyrie_reloading_problems.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000edf0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEDF0 5812 bytes
SHA-256: 85c0b1c30b862a070a9ab0c6bf6240bc6b8dd2e033e00d7615b14583437eee64
font_01_sfnt_off000101a0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x101A0 9920 bytes
SHA-256: d587ccf0d7a9e3859cc5c329de100f17edf66f6cb28b9815e152d475b7f3267d
font_02_sfnt_off000123ef.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x123EF 16088 bytes
SHA-256: 55ee31f2b9c575572aca401957c5cf2f3b57b55b1dd57d1bb6d1e144d3512b41